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John Harrington Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2017) 
 
John Harrington’s book Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law is a landmark publication 
in the field of medical law. Approaching medical law as a rhetorical practice, the 
book advances a new way of thinking about the law and its development in this area 
that moves beyond what has become the standard way of conceptualising medical 
law in the academy – namely, one that is concerned with measuring the success and 
development of the law by the degree to which it is deemed to be ethically 
supportable. In contrast to this ‘law and ethics’ approach, Harrington’s rhetorical 
reading of medical law focuses on the importance of the indeterminate nature of 
legal reasoning and the various contexts in relation to which medical law exists and 
operates. Amongst other things, this approach to the subject enriches and broadens 
our understanding of its historical trajectory and changing forms and characteristics 
by linking it, for example, to developments in political economy, changing forms of 
medical labour, and shifting understandings of medicine. 
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The book’s first two chapters set up its theoretical framework. Approaching medical 
law as a rhetorical practice, says Harrington, demands ‘studying the arguments of 
legislators, judges, advocates, legal scholars and interested others as strategic 
exercises aimed at persuading specific audiences of the truth of certain facts and the 
desirability of certain courses of conduct.’ 1  Law’s indeterminacy means that 
persuasion is endemic to legal practice and argumentation; judges, for instance, seek 
to produce arguments and rulings that are plausible for the particular era and 
location within which they are made. They do so, at least partially, by drawing on 
what Harrington calls ‘more or less concrete and localized common sense and 
cultural forms.’2 Importantly, however, judges do not simply refer to, and deploy, 
pre-existing objective notions such as ‘the community’ or settled forms of shared 
values when constructing their arguments; rather, judicial speech and legal 
reasoning are also in the business of actively constructing such notions and values. 
Consequently, they are agonistic sites where struggles over rival understandings of a 
society’s nature and values are played out. For Harrington, then, rhetoric has a 
crucial political dimension that is useful in comprehending the types of struggle that 
characterise medical law. 
 
As well as this stress on the indeterminate nature of law, Harrington highlights the 
importance to his argument of a contextual understanding of law. Law is embedded 
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in its broader social and economic contexts and we need to investigate the nature of 
this if we are to comprehend medical law as rhetoric. This contextual component 
manifests itself in Harrington’s materialist understanding of law. However, rather 
than adopting the classic Marxist base-superstructure framework, in which the 
shape of the law is determined by the economic base, he deploys Bob Jessop’s idea 
of ecological dominance. This allows Harrington to stress the ‘asymmetric influence’ 
of the capitalist economy over other social systems while maintaining that those 
systems, including the law, remain operationally independent and can themselves 
influence the direction of economic development. The result is a methodological 
approach to the rhetoric of medical law that combines the insights to be derived 
from a focus on legal indeterminacy with an emphasis on the important role that the 
capitalist economy plays both historically and today. Two specific phases of 
capitalism – the Keynesian era that ended in the mid-1970s and the neoliberal phase 
that continues today – operate as a framework through which Harrington makes 
sense of the historical development of medical law. The materialist perspective also 
enables him to direct attention to questions and themes – such as clinical and legal 
labour – that while unfamiliar to the field of medical law, turn out, via Harrington’s 
persuasive analysis, to be both original and insightful lenses through which to 
understand developments in medical law. 
 
Chapter 2 – entitled ‘Paradox’ – continues to establish the book’s theoretical 
framework by developing a theory of the dynamic of change in medical law. Building 
on some existing work in medical law and drawing on systems theory, Harrington 
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argues that rhetorical struggles drive change in medical law. Owing to its 
indeterminate nature, law generally, and not just medical law, is ridden with 
paradoxes that can never be fully resolved but can only be deparadoxified by, for 
example, ‘being displaced to other decision makers (or ‘black boxes’) outside of the 
legal system…’. 3  In other words, law must manage its contingent nature by 
offloading its decision-making to others, as Harrington suggests was the case in 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,4 where judges deferred to medical 
opinion in order, effectively, to define the legal standard of medical negligence. This 
tactic, Harrington argues, will only be successful to the extent that the relevant 
displacement is plausible – something that falls to the judge to ensure. Hence, we 
return to the importance of localised common sense and prevailing cultural forms. 
Does deference to medical opinion, for example, resonate with the types of 
‘common-sense assumptions that are shared between speaker and audience’5 – 
such as the cultural emphasis placed on professional autonomy at the birth of the 
welfare state – and broader social and economic arrangements existing at particular 
historical points in time? Equally, critics of the existing law will contest such 
displacements (reparadoxify them) by challenging both their arbitrary nature and 
the rhetorical means that have been deployed to effect them. According to 
Harrington, this paradoxification-deparadoxification-reparadoxification process is 
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how change occurs within medical law. It means that ‘medical law argumentation is 
unavoidably political’ as it involves the ‘unceasing struggle to achieve plausibility’.6 
 
Having set out the book’s theoretical framework, Harrington uses the concept of the 
topic to structure most of the remaining chapters. Topics, he notes, are  ‘positions or 
common-sense assumptions shared between speaker and audience, from which an 
argument can begin.’7 Harrington’s argument is that this concept is useful for 
charting the development of medical law because axiomatic assumptions – such that 
patients obtain all their medical information from doctors – may become 
questionable owing, for example, to technological developments, meaning that the 
assumption no longer acts as a solid basis from which an argument about a doctor’s 
duty to disclose information to a patient before treatment can proceed. Harrington 
identifies a variety of topics – including ‘national space; time and the organization of 
treatment; the NHS as a utopian project; [and] the idea of medicine as an art and as 
progressive science’8 – that underpinned British medical law in the post-WWII era 
and charts both their decline and the implications of this for the discipline of medical 
law. 
 
This thematic approach to medical law not only distinguishes it from the standard 
academic mode of engaging with the subject – which is usually to take a particular 
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issue within the field, euthanasia say, and examine the legal and ethical issues 
surrounding it – thereby contributing a fresh methodological approach to the 
discipline; it also enables links to be drawn between medical law and a much 
broader range of factors and issues that one rarely, if ever, finds discussed in this 
field. Thus, rather than tackle a case concerning access to NHS health care for a 
failed asylum seeker suffering from HIV (N v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department9) from a human rights or ethical perspective (chapter 3), Harrington 
approaches it via the theme of space. What, he asks, can the case reveal about the 
plausibility of the topic of UK territory – the importance of national scale and the 
nation-state – that has traditionally played an important, though taken-for-granted, 
role in medical law cases? Is this topic losing its plausibility as a result of 
globalisation? How did the judges in the case navigate the topic of territory; what 
rhetorical strategies and devices did they deploy in order to do so? In a fascinating 
chapter on the transformation of the NHS as a result of the shift from Keynesianism 
to neoliberalism, Harrington uses the example of surrogacy, its regulation, and 
academic arguments in favour of greater patient autonomy to chart the rise and 
decline in the utopian idea of the NHS. Presented by its founders not only as a 
source of free health care accessible at the point of need, but as a utopian vision of a 
socialist society freed from private property and money, Harrington traces how the 
rhetoric of medical law has shifted as this utopian vision has been steadily eroded. 
Thus, if the recommendation of the Brazier Report to maintain the ban on 
commercial surrogacy was still plausible in the context of this utopian vision, 
Harrington persuasively argues that some medical law scholars have developed an 
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anti-utopian critique in which the NHS is characterised as authoritarian and doctors 
are charged with paternalism and smothering patient autonomy. This is a rhetorical 
move of its own, Harrington argues, aiming to construct ‘an ideal audience of 
sovereign patient-consumers’10; it also produces a new process-utopia in which the 
free market reigns. This rhetorical move within the field of medical law, in which 
patients and doctors are designed to meet as equals, garners plausibility in the 
neoliberal era and forms a new common-sense against which the commercialisation 
of surrogacy no longer looks out of place. 
 
Another virtue of Harrington’s book is that it prompts us to engage with what we 
mean by the term medical law. It does so by exploring what medicine – its historical 
practices and changing forms, for example – might reveal not only about the case 
law in this area, but about the common law generally. Like medicine, the practice of 
the common law can, at different periods, be read as approximating an art or a 
science (Chapters 6 and 7). As Harrington notes, there are therefore elective 
affinities between medicine and the common law, such that we can learn something 
of the latter’s nature by studying the former. Medical law in this sense takes us 
beyond the common sense understanding of the term that has grounded writing in 
this field for the past few decades. 
 
Constraints of space preclude further discussion of Harrington’s many other 
stimulating arguments and analyses. What, then, can be said of the book as a whole? 
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It brings a dazzling array of theory from many different disciplines to the analysis of 
medical law. Cultural theory, classical rhetoric, political economy, social theory, 
epistemology, political history, as well as legal theory – Harrington draws on insights 
from all of these fields and more to present a highly original perspective on medical 
law. One consequence of this is that the book is a challenging read. This is perhaps 
enhanced by Harrington’s tendency in some chapters to shift back and forth 
between complex abstract theory and descriptions and discussions of case law and 
legislation, or to draw on several theories simultaneously in the analysis of a 
particular area of the law. But the rewards and insights to be gained from accepting 
the challenge far outweigh the occasionally disorienting nature of the narrative. 
 
Harrington’s book will be of great interest to those both within and outside of the 
legal academy who work on rhetoric. At a sub-disciplinary level, his erudite book 
makes a significant contribution to medical law scholarship. For too long, writing in 
this field has been dominated by the ‘law and ethics’ approach that Harrington 
identifies in the book’s opening pages (it should be noted that Harrington himself 
has a novel take on the relationship between ethics and medical law in the book’s 
final chapter). Through its careful, highly original and insightful interpretation of a 
variety of case law, legislation and academic writing in this area, the book takes 
medical law seriously and contextualises the discipline by demonstrating its 
inextricable relationship to broader questions of history, society, economy, and 
culture. His theoretically-informed approach does not mean, however, that he 
sacrifices coverage of familiar material in medical law. The law on surrogacy, clinical 
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negligence, the permanent vegetative state and the end of life, abortion, disclosure 
of treatment information to patients, and much more – all act as important sources 
of analysis within the book. But it is the unfamiliar and revealing ways in which the 
law in those areas is interpreted that make this book a tour de force. Like the law he 
analyses, Harrington’s book might be viewed as a work of rhetorical practice. He 
seeks to persuade his audience that there is another plausible way of thinking about 
and studying medical law that is not driven by a concern with ethical questions and 
the moral goodness or otherwise of the law – a new common sense that seeks to 
draw links between the shifting form of medical law and important, though often 
neglected, questions of, inter alia, political economy, the changing nature of medical 
labour, and the creeping privatisation of the NHS. Given the contemporary relevance 
of such pressing matters of health politics and the book’s charting of the historical 
transformation of health care in Britain, Harrington’s book deserves, and should be, 
read by multiple audiences – including health care professionals, legal practitioners, 
policy makers, as well as legal, medical, social science, and humanities academics. At 
the very least, one hopes that it would inspire current and future generations of 
medical law scholars to develop further the type and breadth of scholarship 
contained in Harrington’s excellent book. 
